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Paranoid thoughts are common across the psychosis con-
tinuum. It is well established that reasoning biases (conceived 
as an overreliance on fast thinking and lack of willingness 
and/or ability to engage in slow thinking) contribute to par-
anoia. Targeted therapies have shown promise in improving 
reasoning in order to reduce paranoia. Psychometrically ro-
bust and easy-to-use measures of these thinking styles will 
assist research and clinical practice. Existing assessments 
include experimental tasks that are complex to administer 
or self-report measures that have limitations in compre-
hensively assessing cognitive biases in paranoia. We have 
developed the first questionnaire to assess fast and slow 
thinking biases related to paranoid thoughts, and here re-
port on its evaluation. In study 1, we generated, evaluated, 
and extracted items reflecting reasoning, and assessed their 
reliability and validity in a non-clinical sample (n = 209). In 
study 2, we replicated the factor analysis and psychometric 
evaluation in a clinical sample (n = 265). The resultant Fast 
and Slow Thinking (FaST) questionnaire consists of two 
5-item scales reflecting fast and slow thinking and is there-
fore brief and suitable for use in both research and clin-
ical practice. The fast thinking scale is reliable and valid. 
Reliability and criterion validity of the slow scale shows 
promise. It had limited construct validity with objective 
reasoning assessments in the clinical group, possibly due 
to impaired meta-cognitive awareness of slow thinking. 
We recommend the FaST questionnaire as a new tool for 
improving understanding of reasoning biases in paranoia 
and supporting targeted psychological therapies.
Key words:  cognitive biases/jumping to conclusions/belief  
flexibility/assessment/psychosis/paranoid thoughts/paran
oia/schizophrenia/questionnaire
Introduction
“If I think fast, I know everyone is against me, I feel so sure. 
Now I try not to jump to conclusions, I slow down, take a 
step back and consider whether people are just doing their 
own thing.” (Quote from a participant in the SlowMo Trial1).
Paranoid and suspicious thoughts, or fear of  harm from 
others, are common in the general population, and occur 
in a range of mental health problems.2,3 They cause sig-
nificant distress and functional impairment, and treat-
ment innovations are needed to improve outcomes.4 
Theoretical models have highlighted the role of  cognitive, 
behavioral and emotional processes in paranoia, while 
psychological interventions specifically targeting these 
mechanisms show promise.5–8 Psychometrically robust 
and easy-to-use assessment measures of  these empirically 
identified mechanisms will assist research and clinical 
practice. A number of standardized self-report measures 
exist, providing reliable and efficient assessment methods 
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for a range of the key putative factors (eg, for sleep dis-
turbance,9 excessive worry,10 low self-confidence,11 intol-
erance of anxiety,12 anomalous experiences,13 safety or 
defense behaviors.14 However, there is no such tool for 
the specific reasoning biases (as outlined in the above 
quote) that may exacerbate or ameliorate paranoia. We 
have developed and evaluated the first questionnaire for 
assessing reasoning biases related to paranoid thoughts.
In our work, we have conceptualized the thinking styles 
associated with paranoia within dual processing models 
of reasoning.15–18 Kahneman notably coined the phrase, 
“Thinking, fast and slow,” in a best-selling book of this 
title, to describe the systematic thinking errors or biases 
used by humans in making decisions and judgments. Fast 
or experiential (“type 1”) reasoning reflects emotion-
driven, instinctive thinking processes. In contrast, slow 
or analytic (“type 2”) reasoning consists of reflective and 
rational thinking processes and is dependent on cognitive 
capacity and functioning.
Evidence suggests that the reasoning biases associ-
ated with paranoia can be framed as an overreliance on 
fast thinking coupled with insufficient willingness and/
or ability to engage in slow thinking.18,19 For example, 
jumping to conclusions (JTC) bias is the tendency to use 
less data to reach a conclusion, such that appraisals of 
anomalous or ambiguous information are drawn on the 
basis of reduced information gathering.20 Robust evi-
dence demonstrates JTC is 4 and 6 times more common 
in people with psychosis than in non-clinical and non-
psychotic samples, respectively and is specifically asso-
ciated with delusions.21–24 Belief  flexibility (BF) involves 
the willingness and ability to take a step back from one’s 
own beliefs, to reflect and modify them in line with newer 
information, and to generate and consider alternative 
explanations.20,25 These processes are derived in part from 
hierarchical Bayesian models of reasoning, whereby 
faulty prediction errors reflect belief  inflexibility, giving 
rise to psychotic symptoms, including paranoia.26,27 In 
psychosis research, BF is assessed according to whether 
people can recognize the “possibility of being mistaken” 
(PM) about their beliefs and whether they have any “alter-
native explanations” (AEs) for their experiences. A lack 
of BF is common in people with delusions and psychosis, 
with only 50% reporting the possibility of being mistaken 
and a quarter reporting AEs.20,28,29 A related construct is 
the “Bias against Disconfirmatory Evidence” (BADE), 
in which disconfirmatory evidence is neglected.30 BADE 
is also associated with delusions, and together with JTC, 
may be linked to difficulties with the integration of both 
confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence.23,31
To date, the constructs related to fast and slow 
thinking in paranoia are usually assessed by experi-
mental, performance measures (ie, the beads task for 
JTC25 and the BADE task,30 clinical research interviews 
(ie, the Maudsley Assessment of Delusions, MADS, for 
PM32 and the Explanation of Experiences, EoE,28 for 
AEs), general self-report questionnaires (eg, Rational 
Experiential Inventory, REI33) and psychosis-specific 
self-report questionnaires (eg, Beck Cognitive Insight 
Scale, BCIS34; Cognitive Biases Questionnaire, CBQ,35 
Davos Assessment of Cognitive Biases Scale, DACOBS36). 
While there are helpful self-report measures for assessing 
reasoning in psychosis, these do not specifically target 
reasoning biases in relation to paranoia. Further, there 
is currently no measure that meets all key psycho-
metric properties (ie, internal consistency, test-rest relia-
bility, construct validity, criterion validity) for assessing 
paranoia-related reasoning biases.
The CBQ is not associated with the beads task or 
MADS and is better viewed as measuring interpretation 
biases.35 The DACOBS JTC and BF subscales have mod-
erate associations with the beads (60:40 ratio) task, but 
they have not been explored in relation to other empiri-
cally established reasoning biases (ie, PM and AEs) and 
there are equivocal findings regarding their relationship 
to paranoia.37,38 The BCIS has not been validated with 
paranoia-specific reasoning tasks, and its construct va-
lidity has only been assessed in relation to delusions, not 
paranoia.39 The REI does not appear to tap into paranoia-
specific reasoning, as people with psychosis (n  =  30) 
reported lower levels of both experiential (fast) and ra-
tional (slow) thinking compared to a non-clinical group, 
and experiential thinking was not associated with para-
noia in either group (n = 1000).19 We identified a need for 
a self-report questionnaire that accurately and concisely 
measures the key reasoning biases relevant to paranoia 
and can be used across the psychosis continuum. This 
would provide an easy-to-use assessment, and overcome 
the limitations of experimental tasks and interviews that 
are complex to administer, subject to biases in adminis-
tration, specific to a single, paranoid belief, or not specific 
to paranoia at all. Consequently, we developed a measure 
for assessing self-reported reasoning in paranoia, the Fast 
and Slow Thinking (FaST) questionnaire.
A challenge inherent to self-report assessments is 
that their validity depends on people’s self-awareness, 
and responses may not reflect objective performance. 
Awareness of one’s own thinking processes is a meta-
cognitive process and it has long been recognized accurate 
reflections are limited in the general population, particu-
larly in the context of fast thinking.40 Impairments in this 
area may impede the utility of self-report questionnaires, 
especially if  difficulties with self-awareness are greater in 
people with clinically significant paranoia. To address 
this concern, we validated the FaST in both non-clinical 
and clinical samples and assessed its construct validity in 
relation to performance tasks and interview assessments 
of reasoning.
We conducted 2 studies. In study 1, we generated, 
evaluated, and extracted items reflecting reasoning across 
the continuum of paranoia. Then we assessed their re-
liability and validity by examining internal consistency, 
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test-retest reliability, construct validity, and criterion 
validity in a non-clinical sample. In study 2, we further 
investigated the questionnaire by replicating the factor 
analysis and validity evaluations in a clinical sample. 
Notwithstanding the potential meta-cognitive aware-
ness limitations discussed above, we predicted that self-
reported fast and slow thinking would, respectively, be 
positively and negatively associated with paranoia, JTC, 
and belief  inflexibility (PM and AEs). We anticipated 
that clinical participants would have significantly higher 
fast and lower slow thinking scores than the non-clinical 
group.
Study One: Non-clinical Group
Method
Item Pool Construction.. Fifty-five items formed the in-
itial pool. Items were selected from reviewing existing 
measures of belief  and cognitive flexibility and through 
expert consultation. The measures comprised the REI, 
the MADS, and the EoE. The item pool included 33 
items involving perceived engagement with fast and slow 
thinking, and 22 items involving perceived ability and 
willingness to use the 2 reasoning styles. Perceived en-
gagement was subdivided into items reflecting the ability 
to generate alternative explanations and to gather in-
formation, disconfirmatory processing, and the possi-
bility of being mistaken. No items created were identical 
to those in existing measures, although some were similar 
in content. Respondents were prompted to indicate the 
extent to which they agreed with each of the statements 
when they had a paranoid or suspicious thought. Items 
were scored on a 5-point Likert scale from 1 = “not at all” 
to 5 = “totally”.
Participants
The sample was recruited by circular email to people 
working or studying at King’s College London. Two hun-
dred nine participants completed the FaST questionnaire 
and a measure of paranoia, Green Paranoid Thought 
Scale (GPTS41). They ranged in age from 17 to 62 years 
(mean = 26.4, SD = 7.7). The majority of the sample were 
female (69%), white (41%), and full-time students (61%). 
The 136 individuals who did not complete both the FaST 
and the GPTS (n = 136) were excluded from the analysis. 
They did not differ significantly in age, sex, or employ-
ment status from those who were included.
Procedure
All participants were administered the pool of 55 items 
and other self-report measures, including the GPTS and 
the REI to assess criterion and construct validity at base-
line (T1). The GPTS is a 32-item self-report measure of 
levels of paranoia. It consists of two 16-item subscales 
relating to ideas of social reference and persecution. Items 
are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, with higher scores 
indicating greater severity. The GPTS has been evaluated 
in non-clinical and clinical populations and has good in-
ternal consistency, validity, and test-retest reliability.41 
The REI is a 40-item self-report scale that distinguishes 
between rational (comparable to slow thinking) and ex-
periential (comparable to fast thinking) cognitive styles. 
Each cognitive style has an engagement and ability 
subscale. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale, with 
higher scores indicating greater ability and engagement. 
Reliability and validity have been demonstrated in non-
clinical samples. Participants completed assessments 
online using survey software, SurveyMonkey. An in-
formation sheet was provided and informed consent was 
obtained. A subsample of participants who consented to 
be re-contacted were emailed 2 weeks after baseline (T2) 
and asked to complete the item pool and GPTS again.
Analysis
The 55 items were examined for endorsement before 
being subjected to factor analysis using varimax rotation. 
Following this, items were reconsidered for final inclu-
sion. Reliability of the final items was assessed using in-
ternal consistency and test-retest. Construct and criterion 
validity was also investigated.
Results
FaST Questionnaire Item Extraction
No items had an endorsement below 10% (>90% of 
responses at the extreme). The Cronbach’s alpha coeffi-
cient of the 55 items was found to be high (α = 0.92), with 
all items above 0.92 on Cronbach’s Alpha if  item deleted. 
Item scores were submitted to principal axis factoring 
with a scree plot. Data were suitable for principal axis 
factoring, as demonstrated by 0.89 on the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy and a significant 
Bartlett’s test of sphericity (χ 2 (1485) = 8587.4, P < .0001).
Following Cattell’s42 criterion, the scree plot indi-
cated the data were best described by 2 components that 
explained 43.6% of the sample variance. Two factors were 
extracted using varimax rotation. Factor 1 comprised 
31 items and explained 26.9% of the sample variance. 
All items related to slow thinking loaded onto factor 1 
(factor loading > 0.4), which we accordingly defined as 
the slow thinking scale. Factor 2 comprised 23 items and 
explained 16.7% of the sample variance. All items re-
lated to fast thinking loaded onto factor 2 (factor loading 
>0.4), which was labeled as the fast thinking scale.
From the principal axis factoring results, the fast and 
slow scales were derived. Items were selected considering 
the face validity of items, the need to reflect the different 
components of reasoning relevant to paranoid thoughts 
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(ie, alternative explanations, information gathering, dis-
confirmatory processing, and possibility of being mis-
taken), factor loading (>0.4), item-scale correlation and 
variance and endorsement. See supplementary table 1 for 
the item factor loadings.
Scales and Associated Norms
Following the above criteria, 12 items were selected, 6 
measuring slow thinking, and 6 reflecting fast thinking. 
The slow thinking scale ranged from 6 to 30 with higher 
scores reflecting slower thinking. The mean total score 
was 22.3 (range = 8.0–30.0, SD = 4.7). The fast thinking 
scale ranged from 6 to 30 with higher scores reflecting 
faster thinking. The mean total score was 12.9 (range 
6.0–30.0, SD = 5.0).
Questionnaire Reliability
The Cronbach’s α value was 0.85 for the slow thinking 
scale and 0.87 for the fast thinking scale, indicating ad-
equate internal consistency. There were no significant 
differences between those who did and did not complete 
the follow-up questionnaire age, gender, ethnicity, or em-
ployment status (P > .05). The correlation coefficient 
(ICC) between scores at baseline and follow-up were sig-
nificant (P < .001, n = 94). The ICC was 0.89 for slow 
thinking scale and 0.90 for the fast thinking scale.
Questionnaire Validity
Criterion and construct validity was assessed by 
investigating the relationship between the fast and slow 
scales and the GPTS and REI (table  1). The fast scale 
had significant, medium-large positive correlations with 
the GPTS. Scores on the slow thinking scale had signif-
icant, small negative correlations with the GPTS ideas 
of reference. For the REI, the rational ability and ra-
tional engagement subscales both had medium, positive 
correlations with the slow thinking scale, and medium, 
negative correlations with the fast thinking scale. The ex-
periential ability and experiential engagement subscales 
both had medium, positive correlations with the fast 
thinking scale, while the experiential ability subscale had 
a small, negative correlation with the slow thinking scale.
Study 2: Clinical Group
Method
Participants.. The sample represented a subset of 
participants from the SlowMo therapy trial (a multicenter 
RCT of a blended digital therapy for paranoia, see 
ISRCTN324486711). Two hundred sixty-five participants 
consented to participate and provided data at the trial 
baseline assessment. All had a clinical diagnosis of psy-
chosis (F20-F29) and all were assessed as holding cur-
rent paranoid (delusional) beliefs, as assessed by the 
GPTS (score ≥ 29 on part B, persecutory subscale). The 
265 individuals who returned completed data ranged in 
age from 19 to 73 years (mean = 42.4, SD = 11.8). The 
majority were male (69.1%), White British (71%), single 
(77%), and unemployed (81%). Individuals who did not 
provide complete GPTS and FaST data (n  =  9) were 
excluded.
Procedure
All participants were administered the 12-item question-
naire and other measures and tasks. These included: the 
GTPS; the persecutory delusions item of the Scales for 
Assessment of Positive Symptoms (SAPS43); the delusions 
scale of the Psychotic Symptom Ratings Scales44; the 
MADS (a standardized interview that assesses a person’s 
main delusional belief, including conviction, possibility 
of being mistaken, distress and preoccupation of this be-
lief  on a scale of 0–100); the EoE (a structured interview 
that assesses whether participants can provide alterna-
tive explanations for their main paranoid belief, with a 
binary [“yes” or “no” rating]); and the beads task to as-
sess JTC. Two jars with different proportions of colored 
Table 1. Associations Between the 12-Item FaST Fast and Slow Scales and the GPTS in the Non-Clinical Sample
FaSTFAST 
(n = 209)
FaSTSLOW 
(n = 209)
GPTSTOTAL 
(n = 199)
GPTSREF 
(n = 202)
GPTSPERS 
(n = 203)
REIRA  
(n = 191)
REIRE  
(n = 188)
REIEA  
(n = 190)
REIEE 
(n = 186)
FaSTFAST 1         
FaSTSLOW −.21** 1        
GPTSTOTAL .40** −.12 1       
GPTSREF .35** −.14* .93** 1      
GPTSPERS .35** −.05 .89** .67** 1     
REIRA −.31** .26** −.28** −.23** −.29** 1    
REIRE −.36** .31** −.20** −.19* −.17* .60** 1   
REIEA .43** −.19** .06 .06 .06 −.10 −.17* 1  
REIEE .33** −.09 .06 .02 .10 −.21** −.11 .69** 1
Note: FaST, Fast and Slow Thinking; GPTS, Green Paranoid Thought Scale; REI, Rational Experiential Inventory.
*P < .05. **P < .01.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/schizbullopen/article/1/1/sgaa035/5869892 by guest on 04 Septem
ber 2020
Page 5 of 9
Fast and Slow Thinking Questionnaire
beads (85:15 or 60:40) are presented and participants are 
told one jar has been chosen. A sequence of beads being 
drawn from one of the 2 jars is shown. After each draw, 
participants are asked if  they want to see another bead or 
whether they have decided with certainty as to which jar 
has been chosen. JTC is rated as present if  the participant 
decides after seeing 2 or fewer beads.21
Analysis
To assess replicability of the factor structure in the clin-
ical group, the 12 items were investigated using principal 
axis factoring, then assessed for reliability and validity. 
Reliability was assessed by examining internal con-
sistency. Construct validity was assessed by evaluating 
differences in scale scores between the clinical and non-
clinical groups, and by correlating the questionnaire with 
the MADS and draws to decision on the JTC beads task, 
and conducting independent t-tests between the fast and 
slow thinking scales and dichotomized measures of rea-
soning: MADS, EoE, and JTC beads task. Criterion va-
lidity was assessed by estimating the correlation between 
the questionnaire and the GPTS, persecutory delusions 
item of the SAPS, and the delusions total of the Psychotic 
Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS).
Results
Questionnaire Replication
No items had an endorsement below 10% (>90% of 
responses at the extreme). Item scores (n  =  12) were 
submitted to principal axis factoring analysis with 
a scree plot. Employing Cattell’s42 criterion, the 
scree plot indicated the data were best described by 
2 components, explaining 48.2% of  the sample var-
iance. Two factors were extracted using varimax ro-
tation. Factor 1 comprised 6 items (factor loading 
>0.4) and explained 26.6% of  the sample variance. All 
fast thinking items were included in factor 1, thereby 
replicating the fast thinking scale in the non-clinical 
group. Factor 2 (factor loading > 0.4) comprised 5 
items and explained 21.6% of  the sample variance. 
All slow thinking items were included in factor 2, 
replicating the slow thinking scale in the non-clinical 
group. To ensure an equal number of  items for each 
scale, one item from the fast scale was removed based 
on the smallest factor loading. See supplementary 
table  1 for the item factor loadings. The mean total 
score for the slow thinking scale for the non-clinical 
group (n = 209) and clinical group (n = 265) was 18.9 
(range = 7.0–25.0, SD = 4.2) and 17.0 (range = 5.0–
25.0, SD  =  4.4), respectively. The mean score for 
the fast thinking scale for non-clinical and clinical 
group was 10.6 (range = 5.0–25.0, SD = 4.3) and 16.9 
(range = 6.0–25.0, SD = 4.5), respectively. See the sup-
plementary table 2, for the 10-item scale.
Reliability
Cronbach’s α 0.77 for both scales (n  =  265), indicating 
adequate internal consistency. Test-retest reliability was 
re-assessed in the non-clinical group for the 10-item FaST 
questionnaire, with consistent findings (supplementary 
material).
Validity
The fast thinking scale had significant small-medium 
positive correlations with scores on MADS conviction, 
distress, and preoccupation (table 2). In contrast, the slow 
scale showed no significant associations. In both groups, 
the fast scale had significant, medium-large positive 
correlations with the GPTS. Scores on the slow thinking 
scale had small, positive, and negative correlations with 
the GPTS for the clinical and non-clinical group, re-
spectively. There were also significant, small–medium 
correlations between fast scale and the persecutory 
delusions item on the SAPS and PSYRATS delusions 
total score. There were no significant associations be-
tween these measures and the slow scale.
Independent t-tests were conducted to compare scale 
scores between (1) people who indicated they could and 
could not be mistaken about their upsetting belief  on the 
MADS, (2) people who did or did not have an alternative 
explanation for their upsetting belief  on the EoE, and (3) 
people who did (≤2 beads) or did not jump to conclusions 
on the beads task (table 3). Independent t-tests revealed 
a significant difference in the mean scores on the fast 
thinking scale for all measures except the JTC 85:15 
task. There were no significant differences on the slow 
thinking scale. The same results with respect to fast and 
slow thinking were also found for “draws to decision” on 
the beads tasks (table 2).
Construct validity was investigated by comparing 
responses on the questionnaire between the clinical (n = 265) 
and non-clinical sample (n = 209) (table 4). For the clinical 
group, scores on the fast and slow thinking scales were sig-
nificantly higher and lower, respectively, compared to the 
non-clinical group (P < .0001). There was nevertheless con-
siderable overlap in the range of the scores for both scales 
between the non-clinical and clinical group.
Discussion
The FaST questionnaire is the first brief, self-report tool, 
for comprehensively measuring reasoning biases in par-
anoia. The fast scale demonstrated test-retest reliability, 
internal consistency, construct validity, and criterion va-
lidity. It had positive, medium associations with paranoia 
severity in the clinical and non-clinical groups, experien-
tial reasoning in the non-clinical group, and delusion se-
verity, belief  inflexibility, and JTC on one (but not both) 
beads tasks in the clinical group. The scale discriminated 
2 groups, with the clinical group scoring significantly 
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higher. The findings suggest that the fast scale provides a 
psychometrically robust assessment of fast thinking as it 
contributes to paranoia. This indicates that people across 
the psychosis continuum can accurately self-report fast 
thinking.
The slow thinking had adequate internal reliability 
and test-retest reliability, although findings in rela-
tion to construct and criterion validity were mixed. 
Contrary to our slow thinking hypotheses, the slow 
scale had a small, positive association with GPTS in 
the clinical group and no relation to delusions in the 
clinical group or persecutory ideation on the GPTS in 
the non-clinical group. In support of  our hypotheses, 
the scale had small–moderate associations with rational 
and experiential thinking in the expected direction and 
had a small, negative association with GPTS delusions 
of  reference, in the non-clinical group. The non-clinical 
group was also more likely to report slow thinking. 
Slow thinking was not associated with any MADS 
dimensions or reasoning variables in the clinical group. 
As we initially speculated, this suggests meta-cognitive 
awareness of  slow reasoning processes may be limited, 
particularly in people with clinically significant par-
anoia. This could be exacerbated by meta-cognitive 
beliefs about reasoning biases, with positive beliefs 
about slow thinking potentially leading to elevated 
rates of  endorsement. Nonetheless, we anticipate the 
slow scale will still have utility in a therapeutic context 
to assess, normalize, and validate slow thinking habits. 
It also has the potential to provide a means of  framing 
and evaluating therapeutic work to encourage engage-
ment of  the reflective mind, through slow thinking, as 
illustrated below.18
“Slowing down shows me the jigsaw puzzle in more  detail 
- parts which looked like they fitted together might not 
on closer inspection.” (Quote from a participant in the 
SlowMo Trial1).
The FaST questionnaire may perform better than ex-
isting measures for measuring paranoia-specific rea-
soning biases. The fast scale is robustly associated 
with all components of  reasoning and paranoia se-
verity, unlike the CBQ, DACOBS, REI, and BCIS, and 
discriminates between groups with clinically significant 
paranoia and those with lower levels of  paranoia in a 
non-clinical group. While the slow thinking scale was not 
as psychometrically robust and may need further refine-
ment, its addition has an advantage over the CBQ and 
DACOBS, as these do not assess the flexible reasoning 
processes that psychological therapy aims to develop. 
We now plan to investigate the questionnaire’s perfor-
mance longitudinally: we will explore the associations 
between fast and slow thinking over time and their re-
lation to therapy outcomes. We note that the fast and 
slow thinking scales have a small, negative association, 
suggesting they are not simply the inverse of  each other, 
but separate systems and their relationship warrants fur-
ther investigation. Replication is needed to investigate 
a larger non-clinical sample, and to address sampling 
biases. The non-clinical sample was fairly homogenous 
(predominantly female students) and the clinical sample 
had consented to participate in the SlowMo therapy 
trial, and so results may not generalize to the psychosis 
population as a whole. Further, different measures were 
used in the non-clinical and clinical samples due to the 
need to reduce the assessment burden in the SlowMo 
trial, and it not being possible to conduct interview 
assessments online.
In conclusion, the fast thinking scale is valid and re-
liable. Reliability and criterion validity of the slow scale 
is promising, although it showed limited construct va-
lidity in the clinical group when compared to objective 
reasoning assessments, possibly due to impaired meta-
cognitive awareness of slow thinking. We recommend the 
FaST questionnaire as a new tool for improving under-
standing of reasoning biases in paranoia and supporting 
targeted psychological therapies.
Supplementary Material
Supplementary data are available at Schizophrenia 
Bulletin Open online.
Table 4. Comparison Between Clinical and Non-clinical Groups on the 10-Item FaST Questionnaire and the GPTS
Mean (SD)
t
Range
Non-clinical Group  
(n = 209)
Clinical Group  
(n = 265)
Non-clinical Group  
(n = 209)
Clinical Group  
(n = 265)
FaSTFAST 10.6 (4.3) 16.9 (4.5)*** 15.3 5–25 6–25
FaSTSLOW 18.9 (4.2) 17.0 (4.4)*** −4.9 7–25 5–25
GPTSTOTAL 51.8 (21.2) 106.9 (26.0)*** 26.7 32–160 54–160
GPTSREF 29.5 (12.7) 50.1 (15.3)*** 16.9 16–80 16–80
GPTSPERS 22.4 (10.5) 56.7 (13.7)*** 32.7 16–80 30–80
Note: FaST, Fast and Slow Thinking; GPTS, Green Paranoid Thought Scale.
***P < .001.
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Please see supplementary materials for the FaST 
questionnaire. Tables 1 to 3 present the study analysis 
conducted with the Revised Green Paranoid Thought 
Scale (R-GPTS, Freeman et al, 2019), which demonstrates 
similar findings to the GPTS for the criterion validity of 
the FaST questionnaire.
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